By Jerome Neu
Is jealousy eliminable? if this is the case, at what price? What are the connections among delight the sin and the satisfaction insisted on via id politics? How can one query an individual's figuring out in their personal happiness or override a society's account of its personal rituals? What makes a sexual hope "perverse," or specific sexual kin (such as incestuous ones) bad or maybe unthinkable? those and different questions on what sustains and threatens our identification are pursued utilizing the assets of philosophy, psychoanalysis, and different disciplines. The dialogue all through is knowledgeable and prompted through the Spinozist wish that knowing our lives can assist swap them, might help make us extra unfastened.
Read or Download A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion PDF
Similar emotions books
This paintings argues little-discussed point of Arab society and executive - the terror that's either used as a weapon by way of executive and felt by means of the folks - has created many of the region's such a lot deep-seated difficulties and hindered the improvement and progress of the Arab humans. It keeps that collective worry and anxiousness play significant roles within the carrying on with political and social disease of the center East.
The Beguiling Serpent appears at feelings, and emotional values particularly. On one point a sequel to a query of Values, it's also a good advent to feelings and values, and excellent path fabric.
Abused via treatment debunks a latest fable: that there are particular indicators in adults which are as a rule attributable to early life trauma. Therapists believing this can look for the hidden reason in the back of their consumers' present indicators and they'll locate it – yet what precisely are they discovering? humans present process treatment do get better stories of scary trauma.
Extra info for A Tear Is an Intellectual Thing: The Meanings of Emotion
Is it? If bare feelings could be distinguished and identified in total independence from patterns of behavior (which were later found to be merely contingently associated with them), both the feat of identification and then the feat of communication with others about the items identified would be mysterious—in the way much is mysterious on a Cartesian view of the relation of mind and body. By contrast, Stuart Hampshire asks: How do we identify a mere something that we feel as anger or as amusement?
I shall argue that despite the hopes of social reformers, the possibility of jealousy cannot be eliminated. It is wrong to think that jealousy is always necessarily misdirected, that it cannot have appropriate objects—on the contrary, it can.
It is not quite the case that we are sad because we cry, but we do come to learn the meaning of sadness in a context where the expression of the emotion provides the first link to the vocabulary for describing the emotion. As Hampshire has put it, "In our classifications we move, as it were, inwards from expressive behavior to inner feeling" (1972c, 155). And, as he explains, things develop: "It is characteristic of the more refined concepts, which we use to distinguish between one sentiment and another, that the subject's own avowals are a necessary part of the conditions of their application.